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Abstract 
The business model of many law firms, as legal professions on the whole, will be facing a 
considerable paradigm change since the work provided by law firms in the form of billable hours, in 
fact, largely consists of services which do not require superior legal education but involve mere data 
procession. It is only a question of time that the consequence – to have all outsourceable services be 
performed by means of legal technology – will become public knowledge in the branch, as the costs 
saved by the usage of legal technology are considerable. Legal technology, or Legal Tech, in this 
context represents a broad range of solutions that affect both lawyers and clients on various levels. 
However, the discourse on automatisation of law has been scant and sporadic. This paper aims to 
shed some light on the current operating technical solutions for innovation with the primary aim of 
explicating the different aims and levels of development of different legal technologies.
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Introduction
In 2016, Linklaters and Pinsent Masons announced their decision to 
invest in autonomous office automatons, to be more specific, Linklaters 
has “developed Verifi, a computer program that can sift through 14 UK 
and European regulatory registers to check client names for banks. The 
company said it could process thousands of names overnight” (Financial 
Times 2016). Linklaters and Pinsent Masons are in good company: The latest 
BDO’s Law Firm Leadership Survey (polling the managing partners and 
senior partners of 50 leading law firms) states that “artificial intelligence 
(AI) will have the greatest impact, with many believing it would replace 
the work of lawyers, or strip out a significant layer of work and revenue 
from law firms. This will in turn bring about changes to their resourcing mix, 
business models and financial structures at law firms” (BDO 2017).
‘Artificial intelligence’ as a term requires some specification in this context, 
as it is often used, especially in media and marketing, as a buzzword 
of changing content. Also, in the context of the latter reference it is 
questionable whether BDO’s Law Firm Leadership Survey indeed intends 
to refer to AI in its technical meaning. In fact, as pointed out by Russell and 
Norvig (2010), from the perspective of computer science where AI is a 
subdivision of strong ( human formed) and weak (non-human formed) AI, 
there are secondary “mimicking thinking and reasoning abilities, without 
actually having these abilities” (Ben-Ari et al. 2017). In the context of legal 
profession and legal automatons, and law and tech, any truly human-like 
acting mechanism is far from being available or even under imminent 
development, and we thus speak only of weak AI – and this also only in 
the three fields of machine learning, natural language processing and 
big data, as there is currently a paradigm change in terms of qualitative 
processing in this field. While Linklater’s Verify may fall indeed into the 
category of big data, many other novel kinds of legal software in use right 
now or under development in the field of Legal Tech simply undertake 
computational tasks without any “intelligent” component at all.
This does not mean that these many innovative software tools do not 
essentially contribute to the comprehensive change of the legal service 
market, as technology is only one of three drivers (Susskind 2014) of this 
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change that will combine to transform the legal landscape radically and 
internationally. This paper thus does not focus only on the AI aspects of 
Legal Tech, but on all “disruptive technologies which do not support, 
sustain or enhance the way that lawyers and law firms have worked in 
the past“ (Susskind 2014). These technologies, however, will fully unleash 
its comprehensive impact only in combination with two further aspects: 
One is the growing cost pressures on lawyers, or – in a nutshell – the “more 
for less challenge”. The second evolves directly from the liberalisation of 
legal services and, in particular, from allowing non-lawyers to compete on 
the legal market.
These three aspects form at present quite an unclear amalgam of different 
and overlapping scenarios, to which this paper intends to shed some light.
Categorising of existing Legal Tech software 
solutions
Various authors have tried to categorise these developments; this paper 
presents and compares two of them prior to elucidating its proper 
perspectives on the issue.
Categorization according to Praduroux
Praduroux et al. (2016) propose eight categories in which legal technology 
presently advances:
1. Lawyer-to-Lawyer Networks, providing synergies for outsourcing and 
by the creation of social and referral networks;
2. Document Automation and Assembly (DIY Legal Forms and 
Contracts), which encompasses the design of systems and workflows 
that assist in the creation of electronic documents. These include 
logic-based systems that use segments of pre-existing text and/
or data to assemble a new document and could also include the 
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so-called smart contracting: In transactions of the traditional type 
people are “bound” to do, to refrain from or to transfer things of 
value. In the networked society and in the digital age, transactions 
do not merely create a binding link but a complex bond or even 
several of these, some of which may refer to rights and duties. On 
a more practical account, the creation of rules nowadays need to 
focus on the protection of immaterial things of value, and control the 
actions of people and non-corporeal entities in an environment that 
is basically borderless (Solarte-Vasquez et al. 2016);
3. Practice Management (Case Management for Specific Practice Areas 
and Legal Billing). Practice and case management software provides 
attorneys with convenient methods for effectively managing client 
and case information, including contacts, calendar and meeting 
information, documents, and other specifics. All that is involved in 
facilitating automation in law practices can be considered practice/
case management software; 
4. Legal Research. Legal search engines based on advanced search 
technology from the fields of artificial intelligence, data mining, 
and natural language processing, with different characteristics and 
features are available;
5. Predictive Analytics and Litigation Data Mining. Predictive analytics 
is the analysis of data through statistical or mathematical techniques 
that results in meaningful relationships being identified in the data. 
These results can then be used for better prediction of future events 
and better decision-making. Predictive modelling of litigation 
management provides the information needed at the beginning of a 
juridical process to improve it; 
6. Electronic Discovery (also called e-discovery, eDiscovery or 
e-Discovery), which is the electronic aspect of identifying, collecting 
and producing electronically stored information (ESI) in response to a 
request for production in a law suit or investigation. ESI includes, but is 
not limited to, emails, documents, presentations, databases, voicemail, 
audio and video files, social media, and web sites – an aspect of 
eminent importance as the law mandates that all legal evidence need 
to be uncovered in law suits and the enormity of the task is staggering;
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7. Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) uses technology, especially the 
Internet, to solve disputes out-of-court through an Alternative 
Dispute Resolution procedure. There are two basic branches of 
ODR, both based on different kinds of technology: The first branch 
may be called technology-based, referring to those systems where 
technology plays an active role in conducting the dispute resolution. 
A prominent example of technology-based ODR systems are blind-
bidding systems. The technology uses multivariate algorithms to 
help parties arrive at the optimal outcome. The second branch of 
ODR consists of technology-assisted solutions referring to the use of 
technology to augment Alternative Dispute Resolution processes that 
exist independently of the technology;
8. Data Security Technologies. These are intended to protect confidentiality 
of data that is exchanged in client/server data transfers. Fundamental 
to these technologies is the use of proven, industry-standard encryption 
algorithms for data protection. (Praduroux et al. 2016)
Categorisation according to Rackwitz and Corveleyn
Rackwitz and Corveleyn, the founders of TPR Legal, drafted a “legal 
innovation matrix”, in which Legal Tech can be distributed into four 
separate quadrants:
 
Source: Rackwitz and Corveleyn (2017)
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These four quadrants refer to:
1. Platform: Access to legal services, i.e. IT tools serve as a platform, as 
for example provided by Neulexa, Lawkick, the Ask-a-Lawyer section 
of the Rocket Lawyer website, LegalZoom, and LawGives.
2. Network: Creating synergies by making use of networks, which differ 
from the platform solutions in a way that “network providers offer 
services themselves in the form of managed services (Thompson 
Reuters Legal Managed Services) or on-demand staffing (BLP Lawyers 
On Demand, Axiom Legal, Eversheds Agile, Obelisk Support). Network 
providers are ideal solutions for managing a sudden spike in work 
volume, meeting a requirement for specific expertise, or temporarily 
replacing a team member. The added value lies in their specialty 
in vetting, preparing, managing, and supporting temporary staff or 
managed teams. Network providers are ideal solutions for managing 
a sudden spike in work volume, meeting a requirement for specific 
expertise, or temporarily replacing a team member. The added value 
lies in their specialty in vetting, preparing, managing, and supporting 
temporary staff or managed teams.” (Rackwitz and Corveleyn 2017) 
3. Software: Providing software which directly performs legal tasks, i.e. 
content analysis, organization, search, or delivery, as for example 
Smartlaw, Tymetrix, Rocket Lawyer and LegalZoom, Flightright 
and New Street Solutions. Rackwitz and Corverleyn elucidate that 
“Software solutions within the legal services industry range from new 
ways to manage and analyse documents (LegalSifter) to analytics that 
use data to make legal judgements and predictions (Lex Machina, 
TyMetrix). Software providers can improve efficiency by facilitating 
and supporting time-consuming tasks like access to information, 
overview, collaboration, document processing, and document 
generation. Software providers include point solutions, offering a 
system for a single issue, and 360 degree solutions (LexisNexis, Wolters 
Kluwer, and SAP)” (Rackwitz and Corveleyn 2017); and finally 
4. Know-How: Managing, creating, and delivering information, as for 
example provided by Bloomberg Law, Thompson Reuters Practical 
Law Company or Wolters Kluwer (and their recent acquisition of 
Smartlaw), who basically provide tools facilitating legal research for 
legal practitioners.
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Comparison and practical significance
While Praduroux et al. (2016) apply a rather linear approach in their 
categorisation, Rackwitz and Corveleyn (2017) to a large degree include 
the findings of Praduroux in their matrix, making it more advanced also 
owing to its functional approach. As they point out in their research as well, 
the matrix focuses on alternative service providers rather than the lawyer’s 
profession as such (who would serve tasks within all four quadrants). Within 
these categories, so far the branches of legal research, discovery, and 
document generation (respectively category 2, 4 and 6 in the Praduroux 
classification) have been proving most profitable for both alternative 
legal providers and traditional lawyers – led by legal research where 
machine automatisation started to play a role as early as in the mid-1960s, 
before for-profit companies like Lexis and Westlaw started establishing 
their practice in the 1970s (Terry 2008). In our days, “the application of 
machine intelligence to discovery resulted in global market revenue of 
$3.6 billion in 2010 ($1.1 billion in software and $2.5 billion in services), with 
growth to $9.9 billion anticipated by 2017 ($2.5 billion in software and $7.4 
billion in services” (McGinnis and Pearce 2014). Rackwitz and Corveleyn 
also report an exponential growth of document generation as a Legal 
Tech target: “LegalZoom, Rocket Lawyer, Nolo, and Law Depot, among 
others, offer online consumer and small-business services using machine 
intelligence. Major financial players have entered the market with Permira 
and Kleiner Perkins owning an interest in LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer 
raising funds from Google Ventures,” resulting in the fact that already in 
2011 more than “20 per cent of new California limited liability companies 
were formed using LegalZoom” (McGinnis and Pearce 2014).
The ethical dimension
The steady growth in online services is not only caused by economic 
interests of the providers of legal services. In the US, for instance, the 
National Center for State Courts published a paper outlining the need for 
state-by-state legal help portals that would not only provide information 
about legal issues but also guide a user through the entire process of 
determining their issue, choosing a path to take, and navigating this 
path to resolution. The article reports a 2010 study of the American Bar 
Association (ABA), which finds that an increasing number of people 
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are using online searches to find a lawyer for a personal legal matter. In 
particular, younger adults are especially likely to rely on online searches 
for finding a lawyer, while very few of those over 65 would use the Internet 
to find a lawyer (ABA 2010). Other studies were carried out in Canada, 
Australia and the United Kingdom. The Canadian group Community Legal 
Education Ontario (CLEO) surveyed legal service providers in Ontario to 
assess the services they provide to laypeople and the new initiatives they 
have promised. The Ontario legal services providers reported problems 
with online legal help and, in particular, that their clients are not able to 
easily find and make use of online information (CLEO 2013). In Australia, 
researchers in Queensland studied how technology is being used to 
deliver legal services in community legal centres. The outcome was a 
great potential of Internet-based services but the current models “are not 
sufficiently user-friendly or effective, in part because they are structured 
around lawyers’ ways of addressing legal issues rather than the mental 
models of laypeople going through a problem” (QAILS 2014). Researchers 
at University College London (UCL) have conducted several studies on 
how technology-based legal help tools are used by laypeople in Great 
Britain. One study found significant growth in adults’ use of the Internet 
to obtain information about problems with a legal dimension (Balmer at 
al. 2011). However, it also revealed some problems and in particular that 
young people had the most difficulty in finding useful and correct legal 
information. The UCL research team followed up with a study focused on 
young adults’ use of the Internet to find legal help (Denvir et al. 2011).
This research shows that online legal services also serve clear non-profit 
legal purposes and serve society from a social aspect. Margaret Hagan 
from Stanford Law School and Stanford Institute of Design has categorised 
these needs as follows:
1. Government/Court-Sponsored Information sites that elucidate the 
law and respective legal procedures, and which explain eligibility for 
receiving services;
2. Non-profit Legal Services Referrals/Information sites that help a user 
to determine their personal legal issue is and what local services are 
available;
3. Private Legal Information sites that help users understand what the 
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law says about certain topics. These include sites that present articles 
and answers on legal issues, as well as more lawyer-focused tools that 
provide in-depth research tools and summaries;
4. Legal Services/Eligibility sites that present screeners to determine what 
legal service or paths users might be eligible to pursue. Often these 
are run by non-profit or start-ups; and
5. Private Legal Self-Help tools that not only provide the user with 
information but that also assist them in getting forms completed or 
even to settle their dispute without going through the courts at all. 
(Hagan 2016).
It can thus also be assumed that lawyers may face in this sense an ethical 
obligation to use low-cost or even free legal assistance software, as 
“clients will be able to more easily afford the legal representation that 
they need in other aspects of their lives” (Arruda 2017) if lawyers are able 
to maximize their time in providing more information and better service 
faster for their clients.
Problems of practical implementation
Already today computers are able to structure legal knowledge and 
regulate technologies in terms of clarifying the sources of legal norms 
and their hierarchical order; analyse lawyers’ arguments from the angle 
of presented values and principles, and, using the big data method, 
analyse the textual interpretative methods and their applicability in 
practice; categorise the cases, ‘hard cases’, and pick up the elements 
from reasoning influenced by extra-legal elements; and finally, be “fact-
determiners” when processing digital(ly) legal documents (Kerikmäe and 
Särav 2017).
Providing an example from Estonia – which pursues to improve juridical 
(e-)services and abandon the outdated modus vivendi – Indrek Teder, 
former Estonian Chancellor of Justice, introduced his start-up company 
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Avokaado, which enables the clients to create drafts of standard legal 
documents, such as contracts, online. He claims that the goal is to make 
regular forms more easily accessible and affordable (The Baltic Course 
2016). Teder, who currently works as an attorney at law, believes that the 
field of traditional legal services is a late bloomer in terms of implementing 
innovation and stresses that “it is no longer acceptable to ask for a tailor-
made price for standard solutions” and suggests that the area of legal 
services will change dramatically within the following years (The Baltic 
Course 2016).
The question is thus not whether to “allow” AI based software and digital 
innovation to enter into legal space, but rather how to determine the 
rights and duties of the stakeholders on the new type of playground.
Even though the potential and demand for automated lawyering is 
steadily growing, no real breakthrough – as it has occurred in sales 
(Amazon, eBay) or the social media – has taken place yet in practice. 
McGinnis and Pearce (2014) have identified three main reasons: “First, 
because machines will not speak in court for the foreseeable future, oral 
advocates will continue to enjoy a lucrative niche, although machines may 
reduce the number of disputes by creating a convergence of litigants on 
the value of a case. Second, those lawyers who are in highly specialised 
areas subject to rapid legal change, like Dodd-Frank regulation, will be 
relatively unaffected, because machines will work best in more routinized 
and settled areas. Third, counsellors who must persuade unwilling clients 
to do what is in their self-interest will also continue to have a role, since 
machines will be unable to create the necessary emotional bonds with 
clients.” (McGinnis and Pearce 2014).
In a globalised world, the potential of uniform automatisation of law further 
depends on the geographical location (i.e. a specific legal system). To 
concede with King (2011), “laws vary substantially from one jurisdiction 
to the next, such that content or services may be legal in one jurisdiction 
and unlawful in another. This variation creates a tremendous demand for 
geolocation technologies that can accurately screen users by jurisdiction, 
so as to allow online vendors to do as much business as possible without 
breaking the law” (King 2011). 
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Reidenberg (2015) is rather blunt by adding that “technologically-created 
ambiguity challenges sovereign jurisdiction,” and believes that the use of 
ICT-tools per se creates excessive tension between conservative justice 
and a lot more liberal digital world. Geographical location is problematic 
in segregated jurisdictions such as the European Union and the Digital 
Single Market, which the Union is struggling to effectuate in cooperation 
with the Member States. Still, the regulation of already existing or potential 
e-technologies and e-services in reasonable abstractedness may 
constitute a considerable challenge itself, but it will certainly require less 
effort in regard to efficiency of legal technology than considering 28 
national legislative peculiarities.
Perspectives
Today we are faced with an abundance of “law practice software 
products” that are mutually applicable for their software2, including 
streamline, clouding, built-in reminder and invoicing systems and 
calendars, but also those that administer certain legal areas.
Yet, the main discourse still concerns the controversial term AI – especially 
in terms of legal justification, promptness has remained similar to what 
Turing had in mind (thinking machine vs imitation of human mind, see 
Turing 1950). As pointed out above, even in its weak form, AI has sparked 
in legal fields only imminent practical relevance in the area of big data.
Big data
Big data usage is defined as a “generalized, imprecise term that refers 
to the use of large data sets in data science and predictive analytics. 
(…) First, it refers to technology that maximizes computational power and 
algorithmic accuracy. Second, it describes types of analyses that draw on 
a range of tools to clean and compare data. Third, it promotes the belief 
that large data sets generate results with greater truth, objectivity, and 
2 See examples at http://www.capterra.com/law-practice-management-software/. 
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accuracy” (Crawford and Schultz 2014). In the context of strong AI, big 
data can help to overcome one of the most striking current shortcomings 
of AI – that immense dataset possessed by human intelligence which we 
simply call “common sense”, i.e. knowledge about how data relate to 
each other. From a legal perspective, that aspect of “common sense” 
is so far of less relevance, as the merely quantitative gap between the 
amount of data which legal service software today proceed from and 
the virtually unlimited potential of big data represents already a sufficiently 
challenging task to be tackled by software. Amongst others, a well-known 
device serving these functions is IBM Watson3, which analyses unstructured 
data and selects the most important information from documents by using 
natural language processing and machine learning. Nevertheless, IBM 
Watson has today several implementations outside of law area and it is 
used only as a form of augmented human intelligence4 – it is not intended 
as an intellect system in the sense that it is meant to complement human 
activity through computer-human interaction whereas decision-making 
remains in the hands of humans, as a strong AI. One could draw a parallel 
here with how calculators initially worked in the hands of engineers and 
architecture professionals (Xia and Maes 2013). In law practice and legal 
science, machines like IBM Watson can contribute to faster and more 
effective (time-wise) research by grasping, collecting and analysing 
the data based on entered inquiries, although its intellect is limited to 
operating only upon commands.
Nevertheless, big data as such has a prominent impact on the legal 
profession from an entirely different perspective, as big data does not 
only provides for opportunities but, from a client’s perspective, also 
far more risks in terms of data privacy and data leakages of litigation-
sensitive data. As it is the lawyer’s main task to professionally analyse and 
consecutively enforce and/or protect the client’s interests, a “prudent 
attorney should advise against a client’s needless dissemination of vast 
amounts personal information that could potentially be used by another 
to the client’s detriment” (Segrist 2015) and thus comprehensively inform 
the client on the nature and risks of big data and advise him to take 
respective measures.
3 See the description and official website at https://www.ibm.com/watson/. 
4 The conceptual framework for augmenting human intellect was initially introduced in the early 1960s by Engelbart 
(1962), where it was referred to as increasing the human intellectual capacity to approach and solve particular 
problems. See his original work Augmenting Human Intellect: A Conceptual Framework at http://www.dougengelbart.
org/pubs/augment-3906.html/. Engelbart’s work has been customized to contemporary human-computer interface 
by a joint work by scholars of Cambridge and MIT (Xia and Maes 2013).
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Big data as a source itself is legally (and also technologically) less novel 
as it seems – as it has always been the case with access to data, handling 
these data appropriately when making legal decisions “involves an 
understanding of how they work, what inferences can be drawn and how 
these can legitimately feed into decisions and actions. It also involves 
transparency in order to enhance accountability, ensure accuracy and 
guard against illegitimacy” (Bennett 2014).
Natural Language Processing
As language is the lawyer’s main course and main tool, the technological 
advancements in the field of natural language processing will have a 
deep impact on legal professions. However, beyond dictation technology 
– which already today replaces secretaries’ tasks to a large degree – 
software is not sufficiently advanced yet to autonomously overtake legal 
writing. Still, once deep learning mechanisms will have reached a critical 
point of autonomy, there will be a comprehensive interplay with natural 
language processing skills as well, as both are closely related – “the 
difference between NLP and machine learning is the added value from 
interactions with human behavior, human language, and even human 
biases and other psychological traits” (Ben-Ari et al. 2017).
Deep learning
Finally, deep learning concerns a central field of legal work – development 
experience – by doing which results in continuing professionalisation. ROSS 
Intelligence5, for instance, which has been built on IBM Watson’s platform 
and works on a research basis, relies on direct inquiries in a question 
form, but provides immediate answers while at the same time being an 
independent learning system. Similarly to Watson, it is simply a supporting 
system, leaving the legal justifications to the command giver by default, 
but the system’s proficiency exponentially increases by practice itself 
(and not by external updates, as usually practiced). 
The central question is how far the core of legal work and lawyering – 
genuine legal reasoning – may be replaced by a machine like Watson 
5 See more about the ROSS from its official website at http://www.rossintelligence.com/ 
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as well in near future. Lippe and Katz do not think so, but “nevertheless, 
software systems, like the aforementioned ones, are potential reduction 
or exclusion means in the process of systematisation of legal order. Even 
though computers can be ridiculed in the sense of them ever replacing 
legal decision-makers, they can be rather successful in structuring the 
legal knowledge” (Lippe and Katz 2014). According to Lippe and Katz 
(2014), they could:
1. Explicate the sources of legal norms and their hierarchic order and 
find contradictions and overlaps; 
2. Analyse lawyers’ arguments from the viewpoint of presented values 
and principles by using the “big data” method and by that move 
closer to a solid and valid system of values; 
3. Analyse the methods of textual interpretation and their applicability 
in practice; 
4. Categorize cases, difficult cases and pick out elements from the 
arguments that were influenced by legally external facts; and
5. Be “the identifier of facts”6 for processing the digital legal documents.
A comparison with lawyer’s daily work shows that these tasks encompass 
the essence of legal work, which leaves the lawyers a question as to what 
their intrinsic function could still be after these tasks have been taken over 
by deep-learning enabled machines. 
One aspect where a human mind will keep its supremacy for a long 
time is rooted in the general distinction between law as authority and 
law as legitimacy; the more sophisticated cases are to be decided, the 
less the concept of law as authority will be able to exclusively provide 
comprehensively convincing answers. When now “legal services are 
delivered by technological portals enabled by Al and legal solutions 
algorithms are proprietary, which version of law will prevail? It is easy 
enough to embed prescriptive codes of ethics into the parameters of 
such algorithms, but what of normative principles of transparency? When 
6  A term used by Dewitz more than two decades ago, see Dewitz (1995).
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legal thinking is increasingly hidden within inaccessible algorithms that 
drive seamless service delivery, is it sufficient to rely on the service provider 
to disclose the mechanisms by which decisions are being made? Or is 
it preferable to engage a human legal professional bound by rules and 
standards derived from normative ethical principles to work alongside 
the technology?” (Coulson 2017). These rhetorical questions succeed to 
draft an already quite defined field of needs for human legal reasoning – 
adjusting the outcomes in terms of transparency. For legal professionals, 
this perspective points out a growing need for specific expertise not only 
in “holistic” legal fields such as legal philosophy and comparative law7 – a 
trend which could, also in legal education, shift the significance of these 
disciplines, taught today merely as adjacent courses (if at all), into the 
core fields of legal education.
Conclusion
For more than fifty years, automatisation of legal services has occupied 
a growing share of the tasks of legal professionals, resulting in today’s 
situation in which especially discovery, legal search, generation of 
documents, creation of briefs and memoranda, and predictive analytics 
are, to a sufficient degree, technically performable by machines. Lawyers 
welcome these technologies for the cost-effectiveness (time, human 
resource), and the society appreciates new mechanisms as they help 
to avoid the extra-legal elements in the process of ensuring the rule of 
law (politics, ideologies) and – beyond that – also provide for a better 
predictability of legal decision (legal certainty) (Kerikmäe et al. 2017).
On the other hand, the century-long and still continuing success of the 
business models of traditional law firms (which keeps motivations for reform 
low), strictly hierarchic structures in these law firms (which are today usually 
led by non-digital natives) and the inherent interest to keep law and legal 
advice in a way opaque and obfuscated to gate-keep the monopoly 
on these services have till this date prevented reasonable adaptation to 
7  Further on the need for reforming the teaching of comparative law, see Hoffmann 2014. 
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technological potentials. Besides, many lawyers intuitionally (and rightly) 
fear that computers may, at least partly, replace them and carefully 
accuse engineers for creating positivistic agents that are not capable of 
evaluating human values, ethics and the “living nature” of law (Kerikmäe 
and Särav 2017; Kerikmäe et al. 2016).
As excellent as these results may be, one has to agree with McGinnis and 
Pearce that “mixing in human intelligence may assure the best possible 
result. (…) Therefore, the disruptive effect of machine intelligence will 
trigger the end of lawyers’ monopoly and provide a benefit to society 
and clients as legal services become more transparent and affordable 
to consumers, and access to justice thereby becomes more widely 
available” (McGinnis and Pearce 2014). This is a vision which, as much the 
society as such would profit, at first sight seems daunting to the practical 
legal profession. But also from a lawyers’ point of view automatisation will 
lose much of its threatening aura if one realises that automatisation is – as 
all technological progress has been for all professions – less the end and 
rather a transition to new forms of work and new kinds of tasks to which 
adaptation will always be possible to those who seriously pursue it. The 
categorisation of legal technologies should become a relevant factor 
not only in the context of lawyer-client relationship (clarity of benefits 
and risks), but also for legal professionals among themselves, as different 
digital options described in this article have distinct capacities and aims. 
Finally, one should be careful to market every digital solution as Artificial 
Intelligence; a clear categorisation and division of the technologies 
used would bring clarity in Legal Tech, which to many still seems as a 
mystified parallel world which threatens to swallow the traditional set-up 
of lawyers’ services. This would reduce the ambiguity and confusion that 
is understandable in the situations where innovation does not (yet) have 
firm frames.
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